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Guest editorial 
… to see or not to see …
At a recent SPIE meeting (Human Vision and Electronic Imaging) Maarten Wijntjes (see 
http://www.maartenwijntjes.nl/site/Main.html) informally joined me at my tabletop at the 
demo-session. Maarten had brought a synopter according to Moritz von Rohr’s (König 1940; 
Zeiss and von Rohr 1907) mirror design.(1) He was interested in reactions.
One eye looks through a large semisilvered mirror, the other by way of a small full mirror 
and the reflection of the semisilvered one (figure 1). This places the latter eye behind, instead 
of besides, the former one. As a result, one (approximately) gets rid of binocular disparity 
for viewing distances over about four feet. The novelty of our device is that it uses plastic 
mirrors instead of the heavy glass ones. This allows for a cardboard folding design that could 
be mass produced for a trifle.
The demo-session was dominated by hi-tech guys in suits, intent on pushing their binocular 
stereo displays. The driving force was business, not science. Some suits had $$ signs in their 
eyes. What really interested me—a mere retired professor in casual attire—was the reaction 
of visitors to our device.
(1) A modern version of the synopter developed by Rob Black is described at http://3dguy.tv/
new‑prototype‑glasses‑turn‑2d‑into‑3d‑without‑electronic‑help/
Figure 1. The mirror synopter due to Moritz von Rohr, only partially to scale. The mirror aa' is fully 
reflective, whereas the mirror bb' is semisilvered. Thus the left eye (LE) looks by way of both mirrors 
in reflective mode, whereas the right eye (RE) looks through mirror bb' in transparent mode, both into 
the same direction p. The virtual position of the left eye (LE' ) is behind the right eye. For distant objects 
there will be a minor scale difference between the left and right retinal images (this scale difference 
becomes vanishingly small for distant objects), but the disparity due to scene structure is much reduced. 
Lack of disparity implies that visual awareness is due to pictorial cues. Indeed, pictures appear in 
articulate ‘relief ’ when viewed this way, the main selling point of Zeiss. It has to be experienced to 
be appreciated. The effect is psychical, rather than physical, belonging to psycho-optics, not optics 
proper. There is no way you may sensibly stamp a ‘depth magnification—number’ on the frame! In the 
photograph you see the semitranparent mirror next to the nose of Andrea van Doorn.
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Maarten had set up a nice picture display that could be viewed with and without the 
synopter. What we experienced was a much deeper pictorial space with the device as 
compared with natural viewing. A picture looks already much more ‘spatial’ when you close 
one eye (‘paradoxical monocular stereopsis’) (Schlosberg 1941), but synoptic viewing often 
heightens this experience. The effect is idiosyncratic. For me it is strong, for some much less 
so. We quantified it years ago (Koenderink et al 2001). We were interested in reactions from 
the public. I collected generic responses.
By far the most common response is this: “what do you want me to see?” The only 
appropriate answer is noncommittal, because the person is to look and see. Next, the person 
picks up the device and feigns to look. They most likely believe to look themselves. Looking 
is not something they’re used to, true of many people. They evidently don’t notice anything 
special, the most articulate remark being “oh”. They walk on without interaction. I think: “are 
these guys interested in vision at all?”
Another common case: the person picks up the device, looks, and says “hey, great depth!”, 
then continues “where do you get the disparity, isn’t this just a single picture?” We: “yes, that 
is the idea”. The person looks again and says “okay, so it’s flat after all”, and leaves. Some 
take a quick look to make sure the device is indeed a Rube Goldberg contraption, uneasy that 
they ever fell for the hoax.(2) Nobody remembers Harold Schlosberg (1941). In a blue mood 
I reflect that the regresses pretty much balance the progresses of science.
About one in twenty looks, and looks again, with and without the device. Some admit to 
“get an effect(!)”. They demand an explanation. In one or two cases out of many we actually 
contracted some genuine interest, but most of the time we were being lectured, free of charge.
This experience is typical. Many people ‘in vision’ are blind, and ‘see’ only their beliefs. 
Good or bad? Hard to say. Stubborn hard-headedness has its virtues. Anyway, the incident 
induced me to write this editorial.
When I started in psychophysics (the mid-1960s) professionals were proud of their ability 
to see. I was told a few years might do it for me. This is similar to what you hear from many 
artists. Most projects involved only a few experienced observers, usually the authors. The 
paper described what the observers actually experienced. Such outdated papers are about 
perceptual awareness. For me—then as now—that is what vision is about.
Within a decade, the scene had completely changed. In the heydays of cognitive science 
you had papers accepted only where none of the authors was an observer, and where all 
observers (the more the better, and ‘subject’ is perhaps more descriptive than ‘observer’) 
were guaranteed to be entirely clueless as to what they were ‘supposed to see’. Naive is 
the technical term. ‘Forced choice’ paradigms became fashionable. I have been a subject in 
experiments where I hadn’t the faintest idea what I was reacting too. Yet I apparently made 
the experimenter happy! In the best of worlds even the experimenter was supposed to be 
clueless as to the visual awareness of the subjects. That would be the ‘double blind’ holy grail. 
All this was supposed to optimize the ‘objectivity’ of the study. Moreover, ‘visual awareness’ 
was supposed to be a mere epiphenomenon, there being no particular need to report upon it. 
In fact, doing so would decrease the probability of acceptance of a paper. I vividly remember 
how ‘phenomenology’ was considered antiquated and obsolete when I entered a psychology 
lab (coming from physics) in the early 1970s. Real scientists don’t suffer from awareness 
at all; they are concerned with only facts. Few people spotted the self-contradictory nature 
of this silly concept.
Somewhere in the late 1980s a famous colleague visited us; because observations reported 
by us had to be wrong, we were deluded. Since he towered above us, this scared us a bit. 
(2) Rube Goldberg (1883–1970) was an American cartoonist and inventor: see http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Rube_Goldberg_machine
Guest editorial 381
We did prepare a demo that should turn him round. Throwing a glance at the display, he said 
“I see it, but I don’t believe it.” I was flabbergasted. My visual awareness is simply given. 
It is not a matter of right or wrong, it is my reality. I am ready to discuss possible causes of 
the awareness, but I am unable to ignore awareness itself. When others convince me that I 
see the world as it is not, I stubbornly see what I see. There is nothing I can do about that; 
nor—I think – can anyone else. I’m surely wrong there?
Never getting used to this, I was relieved when the atmosphere mellowed towards the end 
of my career [the 65 age limit, inspired by Otto von Bismarck’s social reform of the 1880s, 
when few workers lasted that long (Busch 1898)]. Recently, friends shared an experience 
with me: it happens that subjects—when inserted in a luminous environment with their eyes 
held open—spontaneously report that they “see” things. Perhaps even more remarkable, 
it sometimes seems to matter to them what such experiences are like, as distinct from the 
optical influences on their overt behavior.
People mistrust visual (or any) awareness because different persons routinely report 
different awarenesses in front of a single scene. This never bothered me, since I don’t 
take others for identical clones. Science has dealt with this in various ways. The standard 
procedure is to average over observers. Not unlikely, though rarely recorded, ‘outliers’ were 
probably discarded. In my view this has led to many unfortunate, misleading ‘facts’. It seems 
reasonable to accept variations, and use these to get a handle on a problem. As nature provides 
you with parameter variations, why not use them? The alternative is to follow the military 
prescription techniques for helmet and combat boot sizes, and define another International 
Standard Observer. As an additional bonus, this does away with the need to bother with 
actual people. It is an ‘industrial strength’ solution.
Such differences become a real problem when the qualities of awareness (Albertazzi 2007, 
2012) are important factors in the experiment. This happens in ‘experimental phenomenology’. 
We recently reported on ‘shape from shading’. We used the generic stimulus that has been 
the bread and butter in this topic since the 17th century (Koenderink and van Doorn 2003), 
a circular area filled with a linear luminance gradient in a uniform surround (figure 2). 
Figure 2. The figure at left is the ‘generic stimulus’ of shape from shading (SFS) research. Some 
remarkably objective observers report to be aware of a certain planar distribution of gray levels (the 
‘veridical perception’). The majority of observers are somehow aware of an illusionary, articulated 
surface. Most report a spherical convexity, some a spherical concavity. SFS theory predicts a quadric, 
thus admitting saddle shapes or cylinders. The disk at center is uniform, thus SFS predicts planarity, 
whereas many observers report a convex spherical cap. The central gradient at right is identical to that 
at left, except the square outline differs from the spherical one. Here most observers report cylindrical 
shapes. This is not predicted by SFS. In such ambiguous cases it would make sense for immediate 
awareness to be multivalued (Koenderink 2001). Cognition might then collapse the awareness on a 
unique perception, according to current situational awareness and goals. Such problems can be studied 
only in settings where experimental phenomenology is one of the approaches. Truly ‘objective’ methods 
never meet with any problem. Neither do they help solve many questions.
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Most people become aware of a ‘pictorial relief ’, sometimes convex, sometimes concave. 
Our observers reported “cup” or “cap”, and thought of that task as “natural”. One reviewer 
never experiences this, and seriously doubts anyone else does. He is aware of gradients of gray 
tone of some particular orientation. This led to fruitless interchanges. We knew (admittedly, 
we participated ourselves) that our observers reported “cap” or “cup” because that was in 
their immediate, momentary awareness. They could see the gradient as well, but only in a 
particular visual mode that involved somewhat of an intellectual effort.
Of course, we accept that the reviewer reported his immediate visual awareness. We also 
agree that the gradients are projected upon the retina. But we would disagree that the latter 
fact implies that observers cannot be aware of pictorial reliefs directly. Taken to the extreme, 
such an attitude would imply that all one may be aware of are spatiotemporal patterns of 
retinal photon absorptions. Maybe this applies to all others, except me? Possibly yes.
The matter reduces to a philosophical debate that is undecidable. This leads up to the 
question “is experimental phenomenology a science at all?” From my sampling at conferences, 
the main stream opinion is NO! So why not get rid of experimental psychology altogether, 
and simply distinguish between invasive and noninvasive physiology? Or consider ‘human 
ethology’ (Lorenz 1973; Tinbergen 1951), and study human perceptually guided (or triggered) 
behavior like a biologist would study the electric sense in sharks (Kalmijn 1971). We’ll never 
know what it is like to have the whole body sensitive to electric fields (does it itch?), but we 
may very well study how it affects a shark’s behavior.
My own perspective is different. Physiology leaves me with questions. Remember Nagel’s 
(1974) great paper “What is it like to be a bat?” Physiology offers no clue on what it might 
be to be a bat or to be a human. Or to be yourself. “What is it like to be me”—better, “what 
is it like to be aware”, are questions several people I asked thought relevant. Experimental 
phenomenology deals with such questions; physiology cannot.
Conclusions from experimental phenomenology are not formal systems that allow you 
to predict potential pointer readings from actual pointer readings (Eddington 1928). An 
important class of conclusions may be denoted ‘visual proofs’. These are aspects of visual 
awareness that the large majority of visual observers will spontaneously ‘have’ when placed 
in specific, carefully prepared situations. Examples are the Gestalt phenomena (von Ehrenfels 
1890), many familiar ‘illusions’, and so forth. Of course, such silent agreement would never 
occur between a human and a bat, or a shark. It is a human–human type of thing, involving 
species-wide empathy.
Visual proofs are not logical propositions. Logical propositions are by definition fully 
meaningless, and about nothing in particular. In contradistinction, visual proofs are meaningful 
and ‘about’ something (the qualities of awareness). Visual proofs yield immediate, intuitive 
insights for which the matter of truth or falsehood does never occur. They are your reality. 
Even your cherished ‘physical reality’ is derivative of that.
Visual proofs are suspect in science, but they are actually used all over the place—in 
physics, and even in mathematics. You encounter them at the rock bottom of proofs. A ‘proof ’ 
deploys formal, logical procedures to force a reduction to ‘known cases’. Known cases don’t 
require proof. People nod in recognition when they meet them. Sometimes an immediate 
proof may be sufficient. Many of the Gestalt ‘instant psychophysics’ demos are examples. 
In mathematics I mention the visual proofs of the Pythagorean theorem, in physics the 
famous “Clootcrans bewijs” (Stevin 1586, figure 3). Instant proofs are the bread and butter 
of heuristics (Pólya 1957). People no less than Einstein depended on them.
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 Conclusion? I don’t care whether experimental phenomenology ‘is’ a science or not, as 
long as it is an activity that I find interesting. People who ask me “What do you want me to 
see?” I’ll politely dismiss. “To see or not to see, ay there’s the point”.(3)
Jan Koenderink, KU Leuven and Utrecht University
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